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Abstract
Well-designed competition policy can promote consumer welfare and economic
growth. Poorly designed policy can retard both. As China’s importance in the
world economy grows steadily each year, so does the importance of its compe-
tition policy. Because China is a low-cost manufacturing center and home to an
enormous market, foreign companies have invested in China extensively, includ-
ing through joint ventures with Chinese companies that involve sharing the foreign
companies’ intellectual property rights with their Chinese partners.
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Introduction
Well-designed competition policy can 
promote consumer welfare and economic 
growth. Poorly designed policy can retard 
both. As China’s importance in the world 
economy grows steadily each year, so does 
the importance of its competition policy. 
Because China is a low-cost manufacturing 
center and home to an enormous market, 
foreign companies have invested in China 
extensively, including through joint ventures 
with Chinese companies that involve 
sharing the foreign companies’ intellectual 
property rights with their Chinese partners. 
China has been working on anti-monopoly 
legislation for about ten years. Under 
the Provisional Rules, foreign merger 
notification has technically been in force 
since 2003, and increasingly foreign 
corporations are complying with these 
requirements.1  Since China’s 2001 entry 
into the World Trade Organization, these 
efforts have been gaining momentum. It 
is now expected that the legislation will 
be enacted by the end of next year.2 
The Chinese government released the 
latest draft of the proposed Anti-Monopoly 
Law (Draft) in early April and hosted an 
International Seminar on the Draft at the 
end of May. Shortly before the Seminar, 
the American Bar Association (ABA) 
Sections on Antitrust Law, Intellectual 
Property Law and International Law 
jointly submitted comments on the Draft. 
The April Draft, as the Sections note, 
represents a marked improvement over 
the previous 2002 draft, but continues to 
include some provisions that should be of 
concern to US and European companies 
doing business in China, particularly as 
it involves the licensing of IP rights.
Article 56 provides that the Anti-Monopoly 
Law will not apply generally to the exercise 
of IP rights, unless they qualify as an “abuse” 
of those rights that violates the law. The 
Draft, however, does not define what 
conduct constitutes an “abuse” so that 
any violation of the law could, in theory 
at least, be found to be an “abuse.” This 
is of particularly great concern given the 
widespread piracy of intellectual property 
China's Proposed Anti-Monopoly Law: 
Highlights for Foreign Business
1.    The Provisional Rules on Mergers with and Acquisitions of Domestic Enterprises by Foreign 
Investors (the Provisional Rules), issued by the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) and State 
Administration for Industry and Commerce (SAIC), took effect on April 12, 2003.
2.   Passing anti-monopoly laws is on the current legislative plan of the 10th National People’s Congress, 
whose five-year term ends in March 2008. See Wang Xiaoye, Recent Developments in Chinese Antitrust 
Law, Address Before the American Bar Association (Oct. 5, 2004) (transcript available at http://www.
abanet.org/antitrust/committees/international/international_word_docs/speech_to_aba_on_oct.5.doc).
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for which China is already infamous. (It 
has been estimated, for example, that 
90% of DVDs sold in China are pirated.) 
It would be a serious mistake, for 
example, if the Anti-Monopoly Law were 
applied to require compulsory licensing 
of valuable IP rights at royalty levels that 
did not allow their owners to earn an 
adequate return on their investment in 
a misguided effort to assist domestic 
Chinese manufacturers, or to prohibit 
foreign licensors from retaining IP rights in 
derivative technologies created by Chinese 
licensees. Fortunately, the drafters have said 
that they are open to recommendations 
on how to define or narrow the 
meaning of “abuse” in Article 56.
In this bulletin, we describe the key 
provisions of the proposed Anti-Monopoly 
Law. In the course of so doing, we identify 
the principal outstanding issues so that 
our clients doing business with China 
will understand the risks they may face 
if the law is enacted in its current form. 
Key Features of the Draft Law
 Objectives
The April Draft provides that the principal 
purpose of the law is to “prohibit 
monopolistic conduct,” replacing the 
previous draft’s purpose of “prohibiting 
monopoly.” This revision brings the law 
more in line with prevailing international 
norms, which recognize that monopolies 
that result from “superior skill, foresight 
and industry” should not be unlawful, and 
that antitrust laws should instead focus 
on preventing monopolies from being 
achieved or maintained by exclusionary 
or predatory conduct, rather than 
through competition on the merits.3 
We remain concerned, however, that 
Article 1 continues to identify additional, 
more amorphous objectives such as 
“ensuring the healthy development of the 
socialist market economy.” In the United 
States and Europe, competition law is now 
seen as serving a single over-riding purpose: 
to enhance consumer welfare by protecting 
competition.4 As a top economist in the 
Department of Justice Antitrust Division 
says, “Efficiency is the goal; competition 
is the process.”5 In addition, the Draft 
continues to use unduly vague terms, such 
as “unfair prices,” in some articles. The 
combination of multiple objectives and 
vague terminology leaves a great deal of 
discretion in the hands of the administrators 
of the law, thereby creating a real danger 
that the law may be misapplied to regulate 
competition, rather than to protect it. 
 Substantive Provisions
The substantive provisions of the 
proposed legislation are organized into 
eight chapters. Of greatest interest to 
foreign companies are the second, third 
and fourth chapters, regarding Monopoly 
Agreements, Abuses of Dominant Market 
Position and Control of Concentrations, 
respectively. These chapters define the 
offenses under the proposed law.
 Chapter 2: Prohibiting 
Monopoly Agreements 
Chapter 2 defines the types of agreements 
the law will prohibit as monopolistic. 
Article 8 provides that the law will treat 
as monopolistic agreements to (i) fix, 
maintain or change prices of products; (ii) 
limit the output or sale of products; (iii) 
allocate sales markets or raw materials 
purchasing markets; (iv) limit the purchase 
2
3.    See United States v. Aluminum Company of American (ALCOA), 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
4.    Joint Submission of the American Bar Association’s Sections of Antitrust Law, Intellectual 
Property Law and International Law on the Proposed Anti-Monopoly Law of the People’s 
Republic of China 2 (May 19, 2005) [2005 Joint Submission] (available at http://www.
abanet.org/antitrust/jt-pdf/joint-comments/abaprcat2005finalcombowapp.pdf ). 
5.    William J. Kolasky, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, US Department of Justice, The 
Role of Competition in Promoting Dynamic Markets and Economic Growth, Address Before the TokyoAmerica 
Center (Nov. 12, 2002) (transcript available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/200484.htm).
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of new technology or new facilities, or the 
development of new products or new 
technology; (v) jointly boycott transactions; 
(vi) limit resale prices; or (vii) rig bids. 
Article 9, in turn, exempts from Article 8 
agreements that improve product quality, 
reduce cost or increase efficiency, so 
long as they will not completely eliminate 
competition and so long as those benefits 
are likely to be passed on to consumers. 
The new draft of Chapter 2 is a major 
improvement over earlier versions. The 
drafters appear to be following the lead of 
the European Union in moving away from 
an individual exemption system toward 
a US-style rule-of-reason approach. This 
approach should permit agreements that 
have the potential to create efficiencies and 
thereby enhance competition without the 
need for such agreements to be submitted 
to the competition authority for approval. 
The new draft of Chapter 2, however, 
continues to fail to distinguish between 
vertical and horizontal agreements, whether 
with respect to products, prices or IP rights. 
This may not necessarily be a problem 
if the law is implemented in a manner 
that recognizes that vertical agreements 
should be treated more liberally than 
horizontal agreements, but it highlights the 
importance of getting implementation right. 
 Chapter 3: Prohibition of Abuse 
of Dominant Market Position
Chapter 3 defines and prohibits “abuse 
of a dominant market position.” Unlike 
Chapter 2, this Chapter continues to 
suffer from serious, fundamental defects, 
thereby creating a risk that the law will 
be used to regulate business conduct 
in a manner that would be antithetical 
to sound competition principles. There 
are four main areas of concern: the 
recognition of shared monopolies, the 
strong presumption of market power 
from market share, the prohibition on 
excessive pricing, and the inclusion of an 
overbroad essential facilities doctrine.
First, Article 13 defines “dominant market 
position” as “the market power of one 
or several undertaking(s) to determine, 
maintain, or alter the price, quantity, 
or other trading conditions of relevant 
products so as to eliminate or restrict 
competition within the relevant market.” 
This definition makes it possible for two 
or more entities to be found jointly to 
have a “shared monopoly,” even if they 
do not coordinate their conduct. This 
would be contrary to the competition 
laws of both the United States and the 
European Union, which do not recognize 
any similar concept of “shared monopoly” 
without further evidence of concerted 
conduct with anti-competitive effects. 
Second, Article 15 establishes a 
presumption of dominance based on 
market share thresholds as low as 50% for 
a single firm. This risks extending the law so 
that it can be used to regulate the normal 
competitive conduct of firms that have little, 
if any, real market power. Article 15 also 
creates a presumption of joint dominance 
where two undertakings jointly occupy 
2/3 of the market, or three undertakings 
jointly occupy 3/4 of the market. These 
thresholds ignore the economic reality that 
many sectors can be fiercely competitive 
with only two or three strong firms. 
Third, contrary to law and practice in 
the United States and the European 
Union, Article 16 prohibits undertakings 
with dominant market positions from 
selling or buying products at prices that 
are “unfair,” i.e., too high or too low. This 
prohibition could be read to empower 
the administrator of the law to act 
effectively as a price regulator, “a role that 
is antithetical to an efficiently functioning 
market system, and likely to harm 
competition and, ultimately, consumers.”6 
We recognize that China has a history of 
imposing fixed or, more recently, guidance 
prices on commodities. We believe that 
China should continue to move away 
from price regulation, rather than create 
3
6.    2005 Joint Submission, supra note 3, at 17.
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a fresh basis for price regulation under 
the rubric of anti-monopoly regulation. 
Fourth, and finally, Article 22 of the 
new draft embraces the essential 
facilities doctrine, and would prohibit 
an undertaking in a dominant market 
position from “refusing to deal with 
other undertakings that seek access 
to its infrastructure or other essential 
facilities with reasonable price offers,” if 
the other undertakings are unable to 
compete with the dominant undertaking 
without such access. This provision raises 
particular concern with respect to IP 
rights. The essential facilities doctrine 
has been held not to apply to IP rights 
in the United States,7 and can be applied 
to IP rights in the European Union only 
in “exceptional circumstances.”8 Using 
competition laws to compel access 
to valuable IP risks undermining the 
incentives to invest and innovate and 
would, therefore, be antithetical to the 
fundamental objectives of those laws. At 
the May Seminar on the Draft held in 
Beijing, the drafters argued that the law was 
aimed at “physical networks,” specifically 
telecom networks, and not IP rights, but 
the language of the draft law provides 
no such limitation, again emphasizing the 
importance of proper implementation. 
 Chapter 4: Control of 
Concentrations
China in 2003 imposed notification 
obligations on foreign-related, but not 
purely domestic, merger and acquisition 
transactions. Under the 2003 Interim 
Provisions on Mergers and Acquisitions 
of Domestic Enterprises by Foreign 
Investors, notification to the Ministry of 
Commerce and State Administration 
for Industry and Commerce is required 
for onshore transactions based on the 
amount of operating revenues in China, 
the number of investments in China in 
the relevant industry, and market share. 
Notification for offshore transactions 
may also be required if the acquiring 
company’s assets or turnover in China 
exceed certain thresholds. The initial 
review period is 30 days, after which no 
response is deemed an approval. As of 
this writing, our understanding is that no 
notified transaction has been rejected 
or altered by the Chinese authorities.
Chapter 4 of the AML will establish 
new procedures for merger clearance 
for all transactions, both domestic and 
foreign. This Chapter is a substantial 
improvement from earlier drafts in 
which the standards and procedures for 
merger review were extremely opaque. 
There are still concerns, however. The 
thresholds for notification and calculation 
of turnover in Article 24 still do not 
require a sufficient nexus to domestic 
commerce and appear inconsistent with 
the International Competition Network’s 
(ICN) recommended practices, which 
seek to establish an international norm 
for the review of multinational mergers. 
The Draft also relies on subjective market 
share thresholds for merger notification, 
which the ICN advises against because 
they are difficult to apply in practice.
The Draft provides for an initial review 
period of 45 days instead of the 30 days 
provided under the current law. Most 
merger control regimes now have a 30-day 
initial review period. While an additional 
15 days may not pose serious problems in 
most transactions, it would be desirable 
for China to conform its review period 
to the emerging international norm.  
 Administration and Enforcement
Chapter 6 outlines how the Anti-
Monopoly Authority will be administered. 
Article 36 of the Draft provides for the 
establishment of a single Anti-Monopoly 
Authority (Authority) that (1) formulates 
anti-monopoly policies and rules; (2) 
4
7.   See Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko LLP, 504 U.S. 398 (2004).
8.   See Case C-418/01, IMS Health GmbH & Co. OHG v. NDC Health 
GmbH & Co. KG, 2004 ECJ CELEX LEXIS 166 (Apr. 29, 2004).
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investigates anti-monopoly matters; (3) 
handles cases in violation of the law; 
(4) investigates and evaluates market 
competition conditions; (5) conducts 
international exchanges and cooperation 
with foreign jurisdictions and negotiations 
of multilateral and bilateral agreements on 
competition; and (6) handles other anti-
monopoly matters in connection with the 
law. Article 38 grants the Authority further 
powers of inspection to search residences 
and business locations, to access and retain 
relevant evidence, and to inquire about 
bank account information. This unified 
structure seems more likely to result in 
greater efficiency and consistency than 
the division of regulatory authority among 
several government agencies, as provided 
in some earlier versions of the law. But the 
broad discretionary powers granted to the 
Authority also highlight that the Authority’s 
staff will have great influence over how 
the law is enforced. It is important, for 
example, that the Authority’s staff 
include professionally-trained economists 
who understand how markets work.
The Draft provides some checks on 
the Authority’s power. The Authority’s 
investigators must keep a written record 
of their investigation (Article 40), keep 
trade secrets confidential (Article 41), and 
publish the Authority’s decisions on the 
day of issuance (Article 43). The Draft also 
provides undertakings investigated by the 
Authority with certain rights, including the 
right to submit statements and defenses 
to the Authority (Article 42) and the 
right to administrative judicial review in an 
intermediate people’s court. The existence 
of these provisions is a positive sign, though 
they would be more reassuring if they also 
required, for example, that the Authority’s 
decisions lay bare the Authority’s reasoning.
Chapter 7 describes the penalties for 
violations of the Anti-Monopoly Law. 
Prohibited abuses of dominant market 
position face a required cease and desist 
order, and may also face fines of between 
RMB 100,000 and RMB 10,000,000, not to 
exceed 10% of the turnover in the relevant 
market in the proceeding year (Article 
47). Prohibited monopolistic agreements 
face the same penalties, plus a mandatory 
invalidation of the agreement (Article 46). 
Merging undertakings that either failed to 
notify the Authority when required, or 
failed to comply with the obligations the 
Authority set out in its decision to allow 
the merger, also face harsh mandatory 
penalties. The Authority will (1) declare 
the concentration concerned void, and 
(2) order the undertakings concerned 
(A) to dispose whole or part of its stock, 
(B) to transfer part of the business, (C) 
to dismiss the persons responsible from 
their positions and/or (D) to impose 
other necessary penalties. In addition, 
the Authority may also impose fines of 
between RMB 100,000 to RMB 10,000,000, 
not to exceed 10% of the turnover in 
the relevant market in the preceding year 
(Article 48). All three of these provisions 
also declare that any conduct in connection 
with the violation of the anti-monopoly law 
that “constitute criminal offences” shall be 
investigated for criminal liability (Article 49). 
The Draft also authorizes the Authority 
to order investigated parties to comply 
with investigations and provide materials 
and information, and to impose fines up 
to RMB 1 million for failure to comply 
(Article 51). With such potentially harsh 
penalties available under the law, clarity of 
statutory language and transparency and 
consistency of enforcement will be vital.
Conclusion
While the Draft shows significant progress 
from the 2002 version, and demonstrates 
that the Chinese government has taken the 
comments it has received seriously, the law 
still needs further improvement in order 
to be brought into line with international 
standards before enactment. As we move 
forward, it is critical that we maintain an 
ongoing dialogue between China and 
international anti-monopoly experts to 
ensure that China remains a welcoming 
environment for foreign investment 
and a safe home for competition. 
Pamela Bookman, a summer associate 
at the firm, contributed to the research 
and drafting of this bulletin.
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